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I. INTRODUCTION 
 There has been an ongoing debate about whether and to what 
extent the European Court of Justice (ECJ) influences European 
Community1 policy making.  Some scholars argue that the ECJ is 
simply the agent of national governments and therefore has no 
independent impact on Community policy making; others maintain 
that it is an autonomous actor whose decisions influence policy 
outcomes.  The dispute over the ECJ reflects a larger debate 
concerning the level of judicial independence that supranational 
courts can maintain from national governments.  This question is 
relevant not only for understanding the political importance of the 
European court, but also for assessing the potential impact of other 
supranational dispute resolution mechanisms (such as the WTO and 
NAFTA panels).  In this Article I evaluate the ECJ’s policy impact 
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using a structural equilibrium model of European Community 
decision making.  The model demonstrates two things.  First, because 
the ECJ’s voting rules differ from those of the Council of Ministers,2 
the Court is able to make policy decisions that are more integrationist 
than those the Council would adopt.  Second, because the Council is 
then unable to reverse the Court’s decisions, those decisions constitute 
stable policy outcomes.  The Court is therefore able to independently 
determine Community policy. 
 The influence of supranational institutions upon policy making is 
the source of debate between neofunctional and intergovernmental 
theories of supranational decision making.  Intergovernmental 
theories stress the role of national governments in the supranational 
process.  Since no national government can be forced to adopt a 
policy which it does not approve, decision making is restrained to the 
lowest common denominator.3  Neofunctional theories emphasize the 
importance of supranational institutions and “spillover” or “policy 
feedback” effects.  Neofunctional theories quite rightly point out that 
decision making is not constrained to the lowest common 
denominator, and the policies often are enacted at the supranational 
level and adopted at the national level over the stated objections of 
national governments.4  Neofunctional theories rely on the ability of 
institutions to solve collective action problems and lower transaction 
costs as an explanation for the existence and development of 
supranational institutions. 
 Both theories also speak directly to the ECJ and describe the 
function of the Court in terms of their larger theory on European 
decision making.  Intergovernmental accounts describe the Court as 
highly constrained by the interests of national governments, while 
neofunctional theories perceive the Court as autonomous from 
national governments’ influence or control.  These two theories at the 
outset appear to be diametrically opposed:  Either the Court is an 
autonomous judicial institution, or it is the servant of powerful 
                                                 
 2. The Council of Ministers is the Community’s main legislative body.  See generally J. 
WERTS, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (1992). 
 3. See Geoffrey Garrett, The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union, 49 
INT’L ORG. 171 (1995); Geoffrey Garrett, International Cooperation and Institutional Choice:  
The European Community’s Internal Market, 46 INT’L ORG. 533 (1992); Andrew Moravcsik, 
Negotiating the Single European Act:  National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the 
European Community, 45 INT’L ORG. 19 (1991). 
 4. Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court:  A Political Theory of 
Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41 (1993); Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, 
Constructing a Supranational Constitution:  Dispute Resolution and Governance in the 
European Union, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1998); Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Law 
and Politics in the European Union:  A Reply to Garrett, 49 INT’L ORG. 183 (1995). 
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member governments’ interests.  I present a model of European 
judicial interaction that brings some of the core insights of these two 
theories together.  By examining the Court’s interaction with other 
supranational institutions, this model illustrates that the Court is an 
institution that possesses policy discretion within a certain range.  The 
result is policies that are above the lowest common denominator, but 
the model does not rely on assumptions of lower transaction costs or 
collective action problems to explain the institution’s development.  
The Court can be understood as an institution that has a certain level 
of discretion defined by its relationship with other supranational level 
and national level institutions. 
 A structure-induced equilibrium model of this kind, when 
applied to the ECJ, can illustrate the impact the Court can have in the 
policy making process.  Far from being a weak institution with a 
minimal capacity to control policy, the model argues that even given 
restrictive voting rules in the Council, the Court has significant 
powers to set integrationist policies that transfer decision-making 
authority in an issue area from the national to the supranational level.  
Without assuming unitary conceptions of appropriate policies on the 
part of the Court’s justices, the structural equilibrium model 
delineates the means by which the ECJ can successfully modify 
Community policy away from the lowest common denominator.  The 
Court is not an entirely autonomous actor, however:  The difficulty of 
adjusting the Court’s competence allows the ECJ a wide discretion, 
but the voting rules of the Council establish parameters for the ECJ’s 
decisions.  The ECJ is additionally vulnerable in the longer term to 
powerful member governments during intergovernmental treaty 
revisions.  Understanding the Court’s development requires 
examining the treaty revisions and the periods of Community 
governance between treaty revisions. 
 This model makes two main findings.  First, the Court is able to 
produce equilibrium outcomes that would not be achieved in the 
absence of the Court.  When given the opportunity to review policies, 
the Court has the capability to adopt integrationist policies that cannot 
be altered in the Council and yet are beyond what the Council itself 
would be able to adopt.  By offering private actors a new channel to 
pursue Community policies, the Court affects the pace and pattern of 
integration.  The Court, however, has constraints on its possible 
decisions that are defined by the voting rules of the EU legislative 
process and the willingness of national courts to cooperate with the 
ECJ.  While the national governments cannot alter the ECJ’s decisions 
once they are made, national governments can alter and have altered 
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the competence of the Court during the treaty revisions.  Second, the 
model indicates that lowering the restrictions on voting in the Council 
does not unambiguously lead to more integrationist policies.  While 
the initial policy adopted by the Council may be more supranational 
under qualified majority voting than under unanimous voting, the end 
policy may not be any more integrationist than what the Court would 
have adopted given unanimous voting in the Council. 
 The first Part presents the model of European decision making.  
Using a spatial model of Council and Court policy positions based on 
the voting rules in each organization, the model predicts that the Court 
will be able to raise the level of integration in Community policy.  The 
second Part presents an illustration of the model in the development 
of Community law through a description of the development of 
mutual recognition standards within the internal market.  In the third 
Part, the implications of the model in terms of the current literature 
are discussed. 
II. DECISION MAKING WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
 The European Court of Justice has been the dispute resolution 
mechanism for the European Union since the Coal and Steel 
Community Treaty in 1952.  The Court is a permanent organization 
with the competence to interpret the treaties and legislation.  The 
regime is rule based, meaning that the consent of the member states 
involved in the dispute is not necessary for the resolution of the 
dispute, as compared with arbitration or mediation which can require 
consent in each case.  Additionally, the rulings of the court are 
binding in future cases, which gives the ECJ the ability to make 
supranational law, not just rulings specific to the dispute.  The 
decisions of the ECJ are made by majority vote, and neither 
dissenting opinions nor the vote count are published.  Consequently, 
national governments do not know how their national justices or other 
justices have voted. 
 The model begins with the choice of a policy position by the 
legislative body, the Council of Ministers.  During the course of 
European integration the Council has functioned under different 
voting rules.  Both unanimous and qualified majority voting rules are 
used in the models.  The model then explores likely judicial outcomes 
given the voting rules of the ECJ.  The model indicates that during the 
normal course of community governance the Court will be able to set 
more integrationist policies than the Council is able to adopt.  Since 
the ECJ can establish policies that are structural equilibrium positions 
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within the Council, these policies will be durable under the Council’s 
voting rules.  Since the ECJ’s decision can incorporate a higher level 
of integration than the Council policy, private actors whose 
preferences are closer to the Court’s position may pursue policy 
outcomes through the Court.  The model also includes the role of 
national courts in supplying the ECJ with cases and incorporating 
European law into national law.  The finding is that the ECJ has a 
range of policy options that will be equilibrium positions for the 
Council and national courts. 
A. The Supranational Level 
1. Unanimity Voting 
 Policies are considered by the Council of Ministers out of a 
policy set A that contains policies with differing degrees of integration 
(Figure 1).  Under unanimity voting rules, the adoption of policy X 
will be determined by the least integrationist member.  The least 
integrationist member’s ideal point (XC) is the dominant policy since 
that member would veto any policy that was more integrationist than 
it preferred.  XC is the only point where no one will veto the policy, 
and all members to the left of XC still prefer the less integrationist 
policy over no policy (XSQ).  Any policy to the right of XC will be 
rejected because all members could be made better off by adopting 
XC.5  The result is a policy at XC. 
See Appendix.  Figure 1 
If a government’s implementation of the policy is challenged by 
another government or private actors within states, the European 
Court of Justice has the opportunity to review national law and set the 
supranational policy.  In a review similar to Constitutional review, the 
ECJ can review the policy for consistency with the treaties (requiring 
more or less action) as well as reviewing the implementation of the 
policy.  The ECJ is composed of one justice from each member state.  
For the moment, I will assume that justices vote on the policy in a 
manner that mirrors the position of their national representative in the 
                                                 
 5. The Commission is not explicitly included in the formation of policy since agenda 
setting powers are not effective because the Council can amend any proposal.  If amendment is 
possible, the dominant policy will remain XC as the least integrationist member will veto any 
proposal made by the Commission that is to the left of XC.  While the Commission does have 
some gate keeping powers in that it can keep issues off of the agenda, the value to the 
Commission of keeping decision making at the national level is low.  See KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & 
MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS:  RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS (1997). 
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Council (National Position Model).  The ECJ functions under 
majority voting rules so the outcome is the median judicial vote (XJ). 
 The policy at XJ is at the same position or is more integrationist 
than the one produced in the Council and is stable.6  In the next move, 
the Council has the ability to review the issue again.  The Council 
cannot directly overrule the specific decision of the ECJ, but it can 
adopt policies that counteract the ECJ’s policy decision.  There is no 
voting coalition, however, that will be able to defeat XJ.  Any attempt 
to alter the policy to the right, closer to the original policy XC, will be 
vetoed by all members that prefer policies to the left of XJ.  Any 
attempt to move the policy to the left of XJ will prompt vetoes by 
members to its right. Therefore, given the institutional structure of the 
Community, XJ will defeat all other possible alternative proposals on 
this issue.  XJ is thus a structure-induced equilibrium.7  As a result, 
given unanimity voting rules in the Council, the ECJ will be able to 
impose a more integrationist policy than the Council would select on 
its own even given the Council’s response to judicial action. 
 It is possible, however, that the justices may not base their 
decisions on the positions of their national representatives.  The 
justices may be interested not only in their national positions but also 
in enhancing their jurisdiction and the authority of the Court (Judicial 
Preference Model).  More integrationist policies tend to promote 
federal decision making, which increases the organizational 
competence of the Court.  Accordingly, the ECJ’s median voter may 
be to the left of the Council’s median position.  Under this model, the 
Court would have the discretion to choose a policy that is between the 
ideal points of the most integrationist member XL and the least 
integrationist member XC.  Any of the policy positions within this 
range would be structure-induced equilibria since movements from 
the judicial decisions would be vetoed by at least one Council 
member.  Consequently, the justices would have the discretion to set 
policies that would be more integrationist (or less integrationist) than 
the median Council position.  Any decision to the left of XL or the 
right of XC would be altered by the Council to XL or XC respectively. 
 Understanding the impact of the ECJ on policy making implies a 
theory for understanding who will challenge community and national 
                                                 
 6. It is possible for XJ to be at the same position as XC using the National Position 
Model.  If a majority of the national representatives’ positions is located at or to the right of XC, 
then the median justice would also be at XC.  The ECJ should not, however, make decisions that 
are less integrationist than the XC. 
 7. See generally John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory 
Interpretation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 263 (1992). 
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policies through legal channels (Figure 2).  Because the Court can 
move outcomes away from the Council’s position, some actors have 
an incentive to challenge policies.  XI represents the position at which 
an actor (private or public) is indifferent between XC and the 
anticipated position of the ECJ XJ(A).  Anyone to the left of XI has an 
incentive to challenge the Council’s policy through the Court.  XJ(A) 
would be a stable policy position and would be closer to the actor’s 
preferences than XC. 
See Appendix.  Figure 2 
2. Qualified Majority Voting 
 A very similar game is played under qualified majority voting, 
but the ECJ possesses less discretion in the policy making process.  
The dominant policy in Council voting will be the position of the 
minimum blocking coalition at XC* (Figure 3).  The position of XC* 
will vary depending on the member governments that compose the 
coalition.  The position of the coalition will be the ideal point of the 
most integrationist blocking coalition member XC*.  Short of this 
member’s ideal point, the less integrationist member governments to 
the right will not possess the necessary votes to block the proposal.  
The most integrationist member government recognizes this and will 
refuse to use its votes to veto the proposal unless the coalition adopts 
XC*.  The other coalition members will agree to XC* rather than accept 
a more integrationist proposal. 
See Appendix.  Figure 3 
 The range of judicial discretion is from the ideal point of the 
least integrationist blocking coalition XC* to the most integrationist 
policy that retains a winning coalition XL*.  If the Court has the 
opportunity to review the policy, any policy within the XC* to XL* 
range will be an equilibrium position.  Any attempt to alter the ECJ’s 
decision will be vetoed by some coalition within the Council.  The 
win set, the possible range of structure-induced equilibria, for the 
Court is narrower under qualified majority voting.  While the Council 
is able to arrive at more integrationist policies, the ability of the ECJ 
to interpret community law further to the left of XL* is curtailed.  If 
the Court issues decisions to the left of XL* or the right of XC*, the 
Council will pass legislation that counteracts the decision to XL* or 
XC* respectively. 
 The justices on the ECJ are aware that their policy making ability 
is more limited with the qualified majority rule.  Consequently, the 
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justices should be attempting to make decisions that fall within their 
win set.  If the Court makes a decision that is outside the win set, the 
policy will be altered to one of the two range boundaries XL* or XC*.  
In this situation, the justices do not receive any greater benefit for 
deciding outside of the range and incur the cost of having their 
decision rejected by the Council.  Given this knowledge, the justices 
could be expected to make their decisions conform to the win set. 
 As the ability of the Council to make more integrationist policy 
decisions increases, the range of actors who would wish to challenge 
the policy narrows  (Figure 4).  Other things being equal, the 
placement of the indifference point for the challenger XI* is further to 
the left since XC* is further to the left.  Actors who fall between XI 
and XI* would have challenged the policy through the Court under 
unanimity voting but will not do so under qualified majority voting.  
This does not, however, indicate a decrease in the number of 
challenges the ECJ receives.  Anyone to the left of XL* would still be 
motivated to challenge the policy legally.  For the ECJ to have the 
opportunity to review the policy, the Court need only receive one 
request to review the law.  Hence the number of cases that the ECJ 
reviews should not be significantly affected by a move to qualified 
majority voting.  The number of cases that the Court considers should 
be related to number of policy issues covered by the supranational 
regime rather than to changes in the Council’s voting rules. 
See Appendix.  Figure 4 
B. The Domestic Level Game 
 Discussion thus far of the structural equilibrium model begs the 
question:  Why do national governments abide by the rulings of the 
ECJ if those rulings are more integrationist than the national 
executive’s preference?  To some extent this would be a concern for 
any type of non-unanimity voting rules, but it is particularly notable 
for supranational courts where the national executive does not have a 
direct role in the decision making process.  There have certainly been 
many historical examples of national executives disregarding the 
decisions of supranational courts that were not consistent with the 
national executive’s preferences. 
 National executives are not able to dismiss or ignore ECJ rulings 
as easily as they might disregard rulings of other supranational courts, 
because the rulings of the ECJ are not left to the national executive to 
accept or reject.  Instead, the ECJ’s rulings are generally incorporated 
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into the judicial decisions of national courts.8  Ignoring the decisions 
of national courts imposes a significantly higher cost to the national 
executive than not applying a decision by a supranational court.9  
National courts also possess different preferences for cooperating with 
the ECJ than national executives possess.  Alter (1996) and Volcansek 
(1986) note that cooperating with the ECJ strengthens the institutional 
power of domestic judiciaries as well as providing incentives for 
individual justices to cooperate.10 
 While national courts have proven generally willing to cooperate 
with the ECJ, there is a threshold past which some national courts will 
refuse to implement ECJ policy.  Since national courts are hardly 
unitary actors, the threshold varies according to the specific court.  
The national courts with lower thresholds for accepting ECJ policy 
have been high national courts (generally constitutional courts or high 
administrative courts) whose jurisdiction is most threatened by ECJ 
expansion.  The degree of integration that the national courts are 
willing to accept in ECJ rulings varies with the national court’s 
concern over jurisdiction in an issue area. 
 In effect, the ECJ is engaged in a two level game between 
national courts and the Council of Ministers.  The ECJ has a range of 
discretion in making policy that will be stable within the Council, but 
the decisions must also be acceptable to national courts (Figure 5).  
On the first level, the ECJ is working supranationally, interacting with 
the Council.  Under qualified majority voting, the ECJ will have the 
discretion to set policy between XL* and XC*, as illustrated previously.  
On the second level, the ECJ is interacting with national courts.  The 
ECJ will only be able to make decisions that fall below the national 
court’s acceptance threshold XNC.  As long as the ECJ’s decision is to 
the right of XNC, the national courts will incorporate the ECJ’s 
interpretation of law into their decisions and the policy will be a 
structure induced equilibrium.  If the ECJ’s decision falls to the left of 
the national courts’ threshold, the national courts will not accept the 
rulings and will replace the ECJ’s ruling with some policy at or to the 
right of XNC.  The result is that the win set of policy positions for the 
                                                 
 8. See generally STEPHEN WEATHERILL, LAW AND INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
(1995); Gerhard Bebr, Direct and Indirect Judicial Control of Community Acts in Practice:  The 
Relation Between Articles 173 and 177 of the EEC Treaty, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1984). 
 9. See Karen Alter, The European Court’s Political Power, 19 W. EUR. POL. 458 (1996); 
Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone, The New Constitutional Politics of Europe, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 
397 (1994). 
 10. For a much more complete explanation of why national courts cooperate with the 
ECJ and how their cooperation varies, see Alter, supra note 8, at 458-87; see also MARY 
VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN EUROPE (1986). 
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ECJ is the overlap between the judicial discretion in the Council and 
the range of policies below the national court threshold. 
See Appendix.  Figure 5 
 The ECJ’s interaction with national courts is more complex than 
with the Council, since the ECJ is dealing with many political actors 
instead of one political body.  While the Council regularly convenes 
and has procedural rules for adopting countermeasures, the national 
courts do not have the opportunity to agree upon some common 
threshold.  In addition, in any one policy decision, the ECJ only needs 
to be below the policy threshold of the specific court from which the 
ruling was requested.  Yet ECJ decisions become part of the acquis 
communautaire which affects all national courts.11  A situation can 
then occur where the national court (X1) that forwarded the request is 
willing to accept the ECJ’s ruling (XECJ), but the decision will be 
beyond the threshold for another national court (X2) (Figure 6).  This 
decision would not be an equilibrium point, since in later judicial 
action concerning this issue, national court X2 will not incorporate the 
ECJ’s ruling into the national court’s decision. 
See Appendix.  Figure 6 
 To eliminate this situation where two different rules are 
simultaneously in effect, high national courts attempt to communicate 
their threshold positions to the ECJ.  Consequently, national courts 
will express their concern to the supranational court when ECJ rulings 
are approaching their threshold positions.  For example, the German 
Constitutional Court has expressed its concern over the ECJ’s rulings 
on human rights issues.12  The German court has communicated that it 
might be unwilling to use the community law as interpreted by the 
ECJ in this area.  This has led to a type of judicial negotiation, in 
which the ECJ has attempted to ascertain where the German court’s 
threshold position is and to move its rulings below that threshold. 
 In this structural equilibrium model, it is possible for the ECJ to 
have an empty win set.  If the threshold of a national court XNC were 
to the right of the minimum Council coalition XC* (with qualified 
majority voting rules) or the least integrationist Council member XC 
(with unanimity voting rules), the ECJ would be unable to achieve 
any equilibrium decision (Figure 7).  An empty win set has not so far 
                                                 
 11. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Reformation of European Constitutionalism, 35 J. COMMON 
MKT. STUD. (1997). 
 12. See WEATHERILL, supra note 8. 
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been a serious concern for the ECJ, however, since national courts’ 
thresholds for accepting ECJ decisions have been high. 
See Appendix.  Figure 7 
III. TREATY REVISION 
 What does not fit neatly into the spatial model is the possibility 
that the member governments will alter the competence of the ECJ by 
revising the Community’s treaties.  The model is based upon an 
evaluation of the current institutional rules of the Court and does not 
include an explanation of why one specific institutional structure was 
chosen over alternatives.  During intergovernmental conferences, 
however, member governments can change the parameters of the 
Court, the procedural rules of the Court, and the areas in which the 
Court has jurisdiction. 
 Changing the treaty to restrict the ECJ’s competence is a difficult 
undertaking since treaty revisions always require unanimity.  
However, the nature of the treaty revisions, where multiple issues 
including institutional rules are negotiated in one compromise 
agreement, can make it possible for less integrationist member 
governments to place constraints on the ECJ during treaty changes.  
In treaty revisions, the competence of the ECJ becomes another issue 
over which bargaining can occur.  Instead of being a post hoc 
enforcement mechanism for whatever policy compromise is reached, 
the competence and the procedural rules of the ECJ are endogenous to 
the agreement.  Member governments can consider changes in the 
ECJ’s competence together with other policy areas to be negotiated.  
Less integrationist member governments do not need to achieve 
unanimity on the issue of the ECJ’s competence or parameters alone, 
but as a part of a package of policy compromises.  Consequently, in a 
multidimensional bargaining arena, some member governments may 
be willing to compromise on the scope or competence of the Court to 
gain concessions in other areas.  Since member governments have the 
ability to change the rules of the game, the continued ability of the 
Court to successfully alter policy is not assured. 
 The competence of the Court was prevented from expanding in 
the Maastricht Treaty:  While increasing the authority of the Court in 
the internal market, the treaty limited the ECJ’s competence to review 
decisions in the foreign policy and security pillar and the justice and 
home affairs pillar.  This limitation of the Court, in two of the three 
pillars of the European Union, was a definite restriction upon it.  As 
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the Community had been expanding in issues of social policy and 
justice before the Maastricht Treaty, the Court had been able to make 
rules that influenced the Community policies on these issues.  The 
limitation upon reviewing decisions now classified as falling outside 
the market pillar, imposed a real constraint upon the Court’s 
competence.  Because the ECJ is not responsive to member states’ 
demands in the immediate term, constraints upon the Court were a 
requisite for increasing the scope of the integration project.  Notably, 
the ECJ retained its competence within the internal market and 
received the authority to fine member state governments found not to 
be in compliance with Treaty obligations.  Since the ECJ provides 
positive outcomes to member governments not composing the lowest 
common denominator of the Council, these governments are unlikely 
to sacrifice significant sections of the ECJ’s authority. 
 In exploring the evolution and the future role of the ECJ, it is 
important to examine the powers of the Court in setting policy in the 
normal operation of community governance and to examine the 
preferences of the national government, with respect to the Court, at 
treaty revisions.  Focusing on only one aspect of this relationship 
overemphasizes the importance of the one supranational organization 
over the other.  The Council and the Court can place constraints upon 
one another. 
IV. ILLUSTRATING THE MODEL 
 The jurisdiction of the ECJ has expanded since its inception in 
the Treaty of Rome.  Some scholars have attributed the development 
of the ECJ to its ability to lower transaction costs.13  Other 
neofunctional scholars have attributed the development to the nature 
of the legal sphere together with the interests of individual actors in 
greater integration.14  The structural equilibrium model indicates that 
development of the ECJ is due to the ECJ’s ability to alter community 
policy which suits the interests of certain private or governmental 
actors. 
 The ECJ underwent its greatest expansion (the so-called 
constitutionalization of Europe) from 1958 to 1973 when the Council 
was generally voting under unanimity voting rules.15  Under the 
structural equilibrium model, anyone with an interest in achieving a 
policy to the left of XI should have an interest in challenging the 
                                                 
 13. Sweet & Brunell, supra note 4. 
 14. Burley & Mattli, supra note 4. 
 15. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 240 (1991). 
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policy through legal channels.  The ECJ could produce outcomes that 
offered greater utility to liberalizing interests.  In addition, the ECJ’s 
decisions were acceptable, and even (as an aggregate) preferable to 
the outcomes that could be achieved through Council voting.  The 
policy outcomes that the ECJ could achieve for private and public 
interests promoted the use of the Court and gave the Court the supply 
of cases necessary to expand its competence.  The judicial outcomes 
were at least as acceptable to the Council as XC so the Council did not 
restrict the expansion of the Court.  Under this model, the general 
acquiescence of the Council in the rulings of the ECJ is not a result of 
the nature of the legal sphere or lower transaction costs.  The 
acquiescence of the Council is a result of the ECJ’s decisions falling 
within a set of veto-proof policies. 
 This model can also be used in explaining Weiler’s observation 
that the early period of European integration presents a paradox in the 
high level of legal integration occurring concurrently with the 
Council’s movement towards less supranationalism in the form of 
unanimity voting rules.16  This model indicates that the Council’s 
movement towards a more intergovernmental style of decision 
making may have directly contributed to the high level of legal 
integration by giving the ECJ greater discretion in establishing the 
community’s legal principles.  Similar to slamming on the brakes on 
an icy road, attempts to abruptly stop the integration process through 
unanimity voting by the French government resulted in a greater loss 
of control of part of the policy making apparatus.  By moving from 
qualified majority voting to unanimity voting, the range of 
equilibrium decisions that the ECJ could make expanded from XL* 
and XC* to XL and XC (Figure 8). 
See Appendix.  Figure 8 
 The model indicates that during the normal course of community 
governance the Court will be able to set more integrationist policies 
than the Council is able to adopt.  Since the ECJ can establish policies 
that are structural equilibrium positions within the Council, these 
policies will be durable under the current voting rules.  Hence we 
would expect to see the Court making decisions that are more 
integrationist than the Council is able to adopt, and to see these 
policies be durable.  This type of activity should occur with market 
oriented rules and with social policy rules. 
                                                 
 16. Weiler, supra note 11. 
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A. Mutual Recognition 
 One of the Court’s best known decisions is the Cassis de Dijon 
case, in which the ECJ established the principle of mutual recognition 
for the free movement of goods.17  The ruling dramatically changed 
the Community’s policy on determining the validity of national 
regulation of goods and pushed the internal market project forward.  
The lowering of barriers to trade within the Community is an explicit 
element, if not the core, of the 1957 Treaty.  Art. 12 eliminates 
customs duties, and Art. 95 prohibits discriminatory taxing systems.  
Yet, the key to much of the internal market project is established in 
Art. 30 which states that  “Quantitative restrictions on imports and all 
measures having equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the 
following provisions, be prohibited between Member States.”18  The 
principle in Art. 30 is not without qualifications, however, which are 
expressed in Art. 36’s statement permitting “restrictions on the 
imports, exports, or goods in transit justified on grounds of public 
morality, public policy, or public security; . . . .”19  The conflicting 
principles expressed in Art. 30 and 36 left the status of national 
regulations as barriers to trade ambiguous. 
 The negative integration mandate in Art. 30 is not unconditional.  
Since national regulations could be justified under the Treaty, the 
position of the Council and Commission was to harmonize policies at 
the supranational level.  By establishing new regulations for the 
Community, national standards could be maintained and restrictions 
on trade would decrease.20  The obstacle to harmonization was the 
legislative process.  Working under unanimity voting rules, the 
process of building a consensus on Community regulations was slow, 
and often unsuccessful.  In addition, regulations were considered by 
narrow issue areas which required large numbers of directives to be 
proposed and debated.21  The Council’s inability to re-regulate at the 
supranational level maintained the ambiguous status of national 
regulations as barriers to trade.  Without harmonization, the de facto 
Community policy was a continuation of national standards until such 
                                                 
 17. Case 120/78, Reue-Zentrebe A.g. v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntuiein, 
1979 E.C.R. 649, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494 (1979). 
 18. See supra note 7, at 226. 
 19. See supra note 7, at 227. 
 20. See Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 7. 
 21. Karen Alter & Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, Judicial Politics in the European 
Community:  European Integration and the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision, 26 COMP. 
POL. STUD. 535 (1994).  Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia (1994) note that between 1962 and 1984 
only 159 were adopted for an average of seven per year. 
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time as Community regulations replaced them.  The lowest common 
denominator policy was maintenance of national regulations. 
 Private actors engaged in exporting goods that faced regulatory 
restrictions in other member states had an incentive to challenge 
national regulations left in place by the absence of Community 
regulations.  The first challenge concerned the ability of Dassonville, 
a Belgian importer of Scotch whisky, to import his goods, which had 
been certified by the French government, into Belgium without 
obtaining the required certificate of origin from Scotland.22  In 
Dassonville, the Court determined that all regulations having the 
effect of hindering trade were contrary to the principle espoused in 
Art. 30.23  The Dassonville decision called into question the ability of 
member states to maintain national regulations, and eventually laid 
the foundation for the Cassis de Dijon decision. 
 In 1979, a French firm challenged a German regulation 
prohibiting the importation of the Cassis de Dijon liqueur.  The 
German government claimed that public health standards were 
threatened by importing the liqueur because the alcohol content was 
too low.  The Court rejected the German position and ruled that goods 
produced legally in one member state must be accepted in all member 
states.  The Court continued to allow justifications for some national 
regulations, but mutual recognition became the dominant Community 
policy. 
 While mutual recognition might have established a lowest 
common denominator in product standards, the policy was not the 
lowest common denominator in the Council.  The German, French, 
and Italian governments were strongly opposed to the policy changes.  
As relatively high product standard states, these governments 
recognized that mutual recognition would lead to lower product 
standards and disadvantage their goods competitively.24  The 
resistance of these governments to the Cassis decision was 
insufficient, however, to reject the Court’s policy.  The mutual 
recognition policy would give low regulation states competitive 
advantages and provide states with smaller national markets greater 
access to all of the Community’s consumers.  Without unanimity in 
the Council, the Court could effectively shift the Community’s policy 
from a continuation of each state’s regulations in the absence of 
harmonization to the mutual recognition of product standards.  Mutual 
                                                 
 22. Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 436 
(1974). 
 23. See id. 
 24. See Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 7. 
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recognition became the new equilibrium in the Community’s internal 
market policy, since it was incapable of being defeated by alternative 
policies under Council voting rules.  The same Council rules that had 
retarded the harmonization process also prevented reluctant Council 
members from rejecting the Court’s ruling. 
B. Implications 
1. The Court is able to produce equilibrium outcomes that the 
Council would not be able to achieve. 
 The institutional rules of the European Community allow the 
ECJ to adopt policy positions that are above the lowest common 
denominator level. The ECJ has some autonomy from the most 
reluctant Council member and will exercise that discretion when 
making policies.  The relationship between interested individuals and 
firms, national courts, and the ECJ is mutually reinforcing.  Groups 
that could benefit from the Court’s discretion supply the Court with 
cases.  These cases then give the Court the opportunity to improve its 
own position.  The model also implies that current neofunctional and 
intergovernmental theories about the Court lead to a view of the ECJ 
either as an autonomous or a highly constrained actor.  The 
dichotomous choice is misleading and obscures the nature of the 
Court’s discretion in shaping Community policy. 
 While the neofunctional approach is able to explain the 
interaction among national courts, litigants, and the ECJ, it fails to 
explain the several aspects of the ECJ’s development. Neofunctional 
approaches first overstate the degree of autonomy that the Court 
possesses. Feedback and spillover may constrain the Court in its 
decision making.  The Court has a set of parameters within which its 
rulings must fall.  As Ferejohn and Weingast point out, “If we can say 
nothing else with certainty, we can say that there is no “last word” in 
politics.25  No person or individual ever gets to say what the law is 
finally; . . . .”  Other institutions can reply to the decisions of the 
Court.  If the other institutions do not reply, it is probably because that 
policy is a structure-induced equilibrium rather than an 
acknowledgment of the  ECJ’s ability to give the final word on an 
issue. 
 Neofunctional accounts also take for granted the institutional 
rules that the ECJ was granted in the Treaty of Rome.  The access to 
national courts, the competence to interpret the treaty, and even the 
                                                 
 25. See id. at 263. 
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status of the ECJ as a permanent and single court for the Community 
should not be viewed as natural components of any regional trading 
regime dispute resolution mechanism.  The subsequent development 
of the ECJ has been a result of the structure of the Court as 
established in the Treaties.  Most of the ECJ’s path-breaking cases 
have come as a result of Art. 177, the preliminary reference procedure 
which was incorporated in the competence of the ECJ from the 
beginning and has not been incorporated into any other supranational 
dispute resolution mechanisms.  The WTO dispute resolution 
mechanism and the NAFTA panels have not been vested with the 
same institutional rules at their introduction.  Consequently, their 
developmental paths will have significantly different trajectories.  
Neofunctional approaches overlook the fact that the trajectory of the 
ECJ has only been possible because of the competence granted to the 
Court by national governments.  Without these rules, the ECJ might 
have developed as a response to demand for dispute resolution 
services as trade increased or judicial interaction increased, but 
certainly not to the extent that it currently has. 
 Where intergovernmental accounts include the politics of 
integration and conflict of actors’ interests, the approach’s focus on 
national executives leads to misleading predictions about the ECJ.  
The ECJ is constrained and can be limited by powerful national 
governments, but this does not imply that the Court acts in the 
interests of powerful member state governments.  First, policy is not 
constrained to the lowest common denominator.  The Court has been 
able to change policies above the Council’s adopted level of 
integration successfully on issues of positive and negative integration. 
 Second, members of national executives, who make up the 
Council of Ministers, are not the only relevant national governmental 
bodies in the policy process.  Specifically, and very importantly to the 
ECJ, national courts have their own place in national governance.  
National courts’ utility functions are not identical to the utility 
functions of the national executives.  Consequently, the ECJ can 
interpret European law and have it accepted by national courts that 
will not necessarily match the preferences of the national executives 
in the Council of Ministers.  If the national governments had the 
option of individually accepting or rejecting ECJ decisions, then the 
intergovernmental understanding of the ECJ might be more viable. 
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2. The level of integration not a direct function of the 
restrictiveness of the Council of Ministers’ voting rules. 
 European integration has been perceived by traditional literature 
as related to the level of majority voting in the Council of Ministers.  
Restated, the closer Council voting came to majority rule (or the less 
lowest common denominator decision making the Council produced), 
the more supranational policies the community would produce, and 
the deeper integration would become.  This model perceives 
integration differently.  Changes in the Council that lead to more 
majority voting do not necessarily lead to more supranational policies 
on the whole.  Restrictive voting in the Council actually grants the 
ECJ a broader discretion to move policies up from the lowest 
common denominator.  The same restrictive Council voting rules that 
make more supranational policies difficult to achieve initially make 
the decisions of the ECJ difficult to change.  The result is a structure-
induced equilibrium that is more supranational than what the Council 
produces.  Subsequent changes in the voting rules of the Council 
therefore do not necessarily lead to more supranational policies.  The 
policies that the Council is able to initially adopt are more 
supranational, but the discretion of the ECJ is narrowed.  
Consequently, the ability of the ECJ to “ratchet” policies upward may 
be limited.  Changes to qualified majority voting rules in the Council 
do not necessarily mean that policies will be less supranational, but 
the changes do not unambiguously lead to more supranational policies 
either. 
 The difference between this model and other integration 
literature is the incorporation of other institutions into the policy-
making process.  Assuming that the Council, as representative of 
national governments, is dominant in the policy-making process leads 
to the conclusion that the level of policy will be based on the voting 
rules in the Council.  Hence less restrictive voting rules would lead to 
more supranational policies.  Incorporating the Court into the policy-
making landscape alters the impact of voting rule changes.  By 
including another institution with the capacity to set community 
policies, the policy positions of the Community become less 
dependent on the initial actions taken by the Council.  Hence, changes 
in the voting rules of the Council may have an indeterminate effect on 
the level of European integration. 
 Changes in the voting rules of the Council also do not 
necessarily lead to changes in the past decisions of the ECJ.  The 
model does not indicate that the adoption of qualified majority voting 
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in the Single European Act should have been followed by a spree of 
Council decisions that would “overturn” pre-SEA rulings of the 
Court.  The Council as an aggregate and the Court are not in 
opposition to one another.  The policies set by the Council under 
unanimity rules are one form of extreme outcomes.  Those policies 
reflect the preferences of the government on the extreme of the 
Council policy continuum.  The decisions of the ECJ on the other 
hand are much more likely to be closer to the median position of the 
Council.  Hence the policies of the ECJ are probably more appealing 
to the Council as a whole than the policies that the Council itself can 
adopt.  In other words, the policy positions of the ECJ are closer to 
the median voter on the Council than the policy positions that the 
Council is able to adopt given its voting rules.  Consequently, the 
Council, considered aggregately, and the Court are mutually 
supporting.  As a result, changes in the voting rules of the Council 
should not make the Council attempt to rewrite the policies that the 
Court had previously enacted.  The Court is not producing extreme 
outcomes that differ radically from the preferences of the Council as a 
whole. 
C. Conclusions on the European Case 
 One cannot view the Court outside of its proper institutional 
context.  The Court is only understandable when considered together 
with the larger institutional structure of the Community.  The Court is 
neither highly constrained nor highly autonomous.  The model 
presented here suggests that the truth lies somewhere in the middle.  
The Court has policy discretion within some parameters defined by its 
interactions with other supranational and national institutions.  The 
case is the strongest for the neofunctional and intergovernmental 
theories in the arena in which each theory focuses.  Neofunctionalism 
explains most accurately the ECJ’s activity in the time between treaty 
revision since the power of national governments to restrict the Court 
is limited during the normal Community decision making process.  
Intergovernmentalism most accurately explains treaty revisions since 
national executives are able to exert the most influence on policy and 
institutional rules in that arena. 
 The structural equilibrium model indicates that the success of the 
ECJ is a function of the voting rules of the supranational executive 
body and cooperation with national courts.  The discretion of the ECJ 
in establishing policy positions is directly related to the strictness of 
the Council’s voting rules.  Under simple majority rules, the Court 
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would have discretion only when the preferences of the member 
governments have altered since the adoption of the policy and the 
Court is aware of the shift.  The Court also is interacting with national 
courts and is dependent on their continued cooperation.  The ECJ is 
indirectly dependent on the independence of the judiciary to the 
extent that national courts do not have preference functions identical 
to that of the national executives.  This relationship continues to 
evolve and may be changing as the ECJ further develops its 
jurisdiction.  Greater resistance by national courts to expansive ECJ 
rulings could also limit the discretion of the Court. 
 Rather than serving as a substitute for more legalist or 
constructivist conceptions of the role of the Court in the Community’ 
policy making process, the model attempts to provide a more 
systematic framework for analyzing the Court’s policy making 
capabilities.  The model is not inherently inconsistent with other 
approaches.  The advantage of this approach is that the structural 
equilibrium model permits an analysis of the influence of many 
actors, private and public, national and supranational, under one 
framework.  The model highlights the constraints each actor confronts 
in the policy process and thus can aid in explaining instances of action 
and inaction by judicial and legislative bodies. 
 The model also illustrates that the potential impact of 
supranational dispute resolution mechanisms is a function of the 
position of the mechanism within the larger institutional structure and 
the domestic systems.  The development of the ECJ is not only a 
result of the its own procedural rules, but also the competence of 
those organizations with which the Court interacts.  Hence attempting 
to create a supranational court that will behave as the ECJ will 
probably be unsuccessful without similar supporting supranational 
legislative organs and national judicial systems as well.  Instead of 
being a prototype for supranational courts, the ECJ may be unique to 
its institutional environment. 
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